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APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
RULES, AND ORDINANCES
§76-3-203(2), Utah Code Annotated
Felony conviction -- Increase of sentence if firearm used
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for
a term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years, but
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently;
§76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated
Aggravated

robbery

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon
as defined in §76-1-601; or
(b)
(2)

causes serious bodily injury upon another,

Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.

(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if
it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery.
§76-8-1001, Utah Code Annotated
Habitual criminal —

Determination

Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses
having been at least a felony of the second degree or a
crime which, if committed within this state would have been

iii

a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of
second degree, and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second degree
committed in this state, other than murder in the first or
second degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years to life.
§76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated
Possession of a dangerous weapon -- Persons not permitted to
have -- Provisions for aliens -- Penalties
(l)(a)
Any person who is not either a citizen of the
United States or a lawfully admitted alien whose business,
occupation, or duties require the use of a dangerous weapon;
or any person who has been convicted of any crime of
violence under the laws of the United States, the state, or
any other state, government, or country, or who is addicted
to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has been declared
mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession
or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as
defined in this part. The Department of Public Safety shall
adopt rules governing the issuance and use of special
hunting permits for lawfully admitted aliens.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a
firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(2) (a)
Any person who is on parole or probation for
a felony or is incarcerated in a correctional facility may
not have in his possession or under his custody or control
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of
a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a
firearm, explosive, or infernal machine he is guilty of a
second degree felony.

iv

Rule 11 (5) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
no contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has
found:
(a) if the defendant is not represented by
counsel, he has knowingly waived his right to counsel
and does not desire counsel;
(b)

the plea is voluntarily made;

(c) the defendant knows he has rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what
agreement has been reached; and
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAHf

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA,

:
:
:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900264-CA
Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by §78-2A-3(2)(f),
Utah Code Annotated.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over

"appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a First Degree Felony."

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err in accepting defendant's guilty plea
by failing to comply with Rule 11(5)(c) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure which requires the court to review defendant's
constitutional rights?
Did the trial court likewise fail to advise defendant, as
required by Rule 11 (5) (e), that the sentence for the Firearm
Enhancement could be imposed consecutively with the sentence for
the Attempted Aggravated Robbery?
Did the trial court fail to advise defendant, as required by
Rule 11(5)(e) that his sentence for Attempted Aggravated Robbery
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plus Firearm Enhancement could be run consecutively with the
sentence he was already serving?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged, by Amended Information filed on
December 29, 1987, with three (3) counts:

Aggravated Robbery, a

First Degree Felony, in violation of §76-6-302, Utah Code
Annotated

(1953, as amended); Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by

a Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of §7610-503, Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended); and under the

Habitual Criminal provisions of §76-8-1001, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended).

(R. 19-21.)

Defendant waived his right to

Preliminary Hearing with the State's consent.

On January 14,

1988, defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial District
Court for trial.

(R. 4.)

On March 21, 1988, defendant moved to withdraw his
previously entered plea of not guilty in exchange for reduced
charges.

(T. 3/21/88, p. 1.)

According to the plea bargain

agreement, defendant would plead guilty to Attempted Aggravated
Robbery, a Second Degree Felony with Firearm Enhancement, and, in
exchange, the State would move to dismiss Counts II and III of
the Information.

(T. 3/21/88, p. 1.)

The trial court accepted

defendant's guilty plea to Attempted Aggravated Robbery and
dismissed Counts II and III.

(T. 3/21/88, p. 4.)

After entering his plea, defendant waived the two (2)

2

day minimum time for sentencing and was sentenced immediately.
(T. 3/21/88, p. 5.)

The State recommended that defendant serve a

term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years consecutively to the
sentence he was already serving.

Additionally, the State argued

for an additional sentence of one (1) year for Use of a Firearm,
pursuant to §76-3-203(2).

(T.3/21/88, p. 5-6.)

Defendant

requested that he serve a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years
concurrently with his previous commitment.

(T. 3/21/88, p. 4.)

The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one
(1) to fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison to be served
consecutively with defendant's previous commitment.
(T. 3/21/88, p. 9.)

The trial court also sentenced defendant to

an additional term of one (1) year as enhancement for the use of
a firearm to be served consecutively with the other two (2)
sentences.

(T 3/21/88, p. 9.)

Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on
August 7, 1989.

(R. 41.)

Defendant's original counsel moved to

withdraw and the Third Judicial District Court granted the
motion.

(R. 37-40.)

New counsel was appointed for defendant.

On February 2, 1990, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon heard
defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

Defendant argued

that the court should allow him to withdraw his plea because the
trial court failed to comply with Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

(T. 2/2/90, p. 25.)

Specifically, defendant

argued that he had not been advised of his constitutional rights
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and did not understand that the firearm count could be imposed
consecutively with his other sentences.

(T. 2/2/90, p. 42-43.)

Defendant also argued that his guilty plea was involuntary
because the court failed to advise him that he might be required
to serve his new sentence consecutively with the sentence he was
already serving.

(T. 2/2/90, p. 25.)

In response, the State asserted that defendant signed
an affidavit before entering his plea which enumerated
defendant's constitutional rights as required by Rule 11(5) (c).
(T. 2/2/90, p. 48.)

The affidavit also stated that defendant's

sentence was subject to enhancement for the use of a firearm.
(T. 2/2/90, p. 30.)

The State argued that this notice of

enhancement in the affidavit complied with the requirement in
Rule 11(5) (e) that defendant know of "the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences."

(T. 2/2/90, p. 29-30.)

The State also argued that the court was not required to advise
defendant that his sentence may run consecutively with his
previous commitment.

(T. 2/2/90, p. 31-32.)

The lower court denied defendant's Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea.

The lower court held that defendant's affidavit

sufficiently advised him of his constitutional rights; that
defendant understood, by the word "enhancement," that his firearm
sentence could be imposed consecutively; and that the court was
not required to inform him that his new sentence could be imposed
consecutively with the sentence he was already serving. (T.
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2/2/90, p. 49-57.)

See also (R. 55-57).

On May 17, 1990,

counsel for defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.

(R. 58.)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Due to the fact that this case was not tried, there is
no other evidence to cite in support of a statement of the facts.
Additional facts concerning the trial court are presented in the
Argument section of this Brief, as those facts relate to the
issues raised.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.d 1309 (Utah, 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court adopted a strict compliance standard in
accepting a defendant's guilty plea.

It held that the trial

court must strictly comply with Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure by making an on-the-record showing that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under the
Constitution.

The Utah Supreme Court also held that the use of a

written affidavit cannot alone achieve compliance with Rule
11(5).

The trial court must personally apprise the defendant of

his rights on the record prior to the entry of the guilty plea
before a knowing and voluntary plea may be entered.
In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App., 1989),
the Utah Court of Appeals held that compliance with Rule 11(5)
mandates that a defendant be advised of his specific
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constitutional rights:

The right against self-incrimination, to

a jury, to appeal, and to confront witnesses.

The Court of

Appeals also held that Rule 11(5) mandates that a defendant be
informed of the maximum possible sentence for the offense,
including the possibility of consecutive sentences.

In State v.

Smith, 777 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court
held that the defendant must be "unequivocally and clearly
informed about the sentence that would be imposed."
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to advise
defendant of his specific constitutional rights.

The trial court

also failed to clearly and unequivocally advise defendant that
his firearm enhancement and the sentence he was already serving
might be imposed consecutively.

Therefore, the trial court

failed to comply with Rule 11(5) and defendant should be allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
STRICT STANDARDS OF RULE 11(5) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ACCEPTING
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
Rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, in pertinent part:
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial, and to confront and
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(e)

cross-examine witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea, he waives all
of those rights;...
the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed
upon him for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;...

In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah, 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court held:

"Rule 11(5) (e) squarely places on trial

courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule
11(5) (e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered."

.Id.

at 1312.

Further, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial court
may not rely on a written affidavit to ensure that these
requirements are met.

"The use of a sufficient affidavit can

promote efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the starting
point, not an end point, in the pleading process."
1313.

740 P.2d at

The Court imposed an affirmative duty on the part of the

trial judge to review the affidavit with the defendant.

"The

trial judge should then review the statements in the affidavit
with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed
by §77-35-11 on the record before accepting the guilty plea."
740 P.2d at 1314.
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the former
"record as a whole" test.

See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309

(Utah, 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah, 1985);
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Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah, 1989).
entered before Utah Supreme Court decided

(Guilty plea

Gibbons).

Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals has followed the
strict compliance standard of Gibbons,

In State v. Valencia, 776

P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989), the Court held "[s]trict, and
not just substantial, compliance with [Rule 11(5)] is required."
Similarly, in State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
(1990), the Utah Court of Appeals considered the voluntariness of
defendant's guilty plea and the trial court's compliance with
Rule 11(5).

2

It held that the trial court could not just rely

on defendant's written affidavit to ensure that the plea was
voluntary and in compliance with Rule 11(5).

143 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 37.
Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals held in
Valencia that the examination of the defendant regarding his
affidavit "should be sufficiently detailed and extensive to
provide a factual basis to conclude from defendant's responses
that his decision was knowing and voluntary."

776 P.2d at 1335.

State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App.
1988), "when a new rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear
break with the past, it will not be applied retroactively."
2

..
The Utah Court of Appeals recently upheld its decision
in Pharris that a trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11
in accepting a guilty plea. See State v. Maguire, Case No.
900045-CA (filed 11/16/90).
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A.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENUMERATE
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
ACCEPTING HIS PLEA
In determining whether defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, the trial court
asked the following:
THE COURT:
You understand that you have
certain rights under the constitution and if
you plead guilty here today, that you are
waiving those rights
MR QUINTANA:

Yes

(T. 3/21/88, p. 1-2)
The trial courtfs inquiry failed to comply with the
strict requirements of Rule 11(5).

In Valencia, the Court of

Appeals held that general questions regarding a defendant's
constitutional rights are insufficient.

"Specific inquiry should

be made as to whether defendant understands that by his plea he
waives his rights against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to
appeal, and to confront witnesses."

[Emphasis added.]

776 P.2d

at 1335.
Likewise, in Pharris, the Court of Appeals held:
[T]he trial court did not as required by Rule
11 (5) (c) inform defendant at the time the plea was
taken that he waived his constitutional right
against self-incrimination by pleading guilty to
the offense. The State argues that this
information is included in the affidavit.
However, inclusion in the affidavit alone is not
sufficient to ensure that the defendant's
constitutional rights are protected. 143 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 37.
Because the trial court failed to make a specific
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inquiry regarding defendant's constitutional rights as required
by Rule 11 (5) , defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea.

B.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADVISE
DEFENDANT THAT HE COULD BE SENTENCED
CONSECUTIVELY FOR FIREARM ENHANCEMENT
The trial court failed to inform defendant that he
might have to serve a consecutive sentence for the use of a
firearm.

Because defendant was not properly informed, his guilty

plea was not knowing and voluntary.

The trial court advised the

defendant as follows:
THE COURT:
You also understand that there
could be an enhancement of zero to five years
because you used a firearm or a gun at the time of
the attempted robbery
MR QUINTANA:

Yes

(T. 3/21/88, p. 3)
Never did the trial court make a specific inquiry into
whether defendant knew that enhancement meant a possibility of
consecutive sentences.

The language of Rule 11(5) (e) is clear.

The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
no contest, and may not accept the plea until the
court has found:
(e)

the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed
upon him for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences. [Emphasis
added.]

In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah, 1988), the
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Utah Supreme Court made it clear that a trial court must show on
the record that a defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary.
[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the plea
is entered for the defendant's understanding of
the nature of the charge against him." McCarthy,
394 U.S. at 470, ...We think the most effective
way to do this is to have a defendant state in his
own words his understanding of the offense and the
action which make him guilty of the offense.
Id. at 1273.
In State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court held that adequate knowledge is crucial for a plea
to be voluntary:

"[t]he record must show that [defendant] was

unequivocally and clearly informed about the sentence that would
be imposed."

[Emphasis added.]

J^d. at 466.

In the instant case, defendant was not unequivocally
and clearly informed that his firearm enhancement might be
imposed consecutively.

While the lower court did inform

defendant of the enhancement charge, the record does not show
that defendant understood that it could be imposed consecutively.
The failure to clearly inform defendant that enhancement might
mean imposition of a consecutive sentence rendered his plea
unknowing and involuntary.
Likewise in Vasilacopulos, the Utah Court of Appeals
rejected the State's contention that the trial court adequately
informed the defendant of the possibility of consecutive
sentences.

In that case, the Court examined the trial court's

inadequate phraseology under the weaker "record as a whole test"
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and concluded:
The record as a whole supports a conclusion that
defendant would only be subject to consecutive
sentences under certain conditions. Paragraph 7
of defendant's affidavit states, flI also know that
if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting
sentencing upon another offense of which I have
been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed on me. 756
P.2d at 95.
From this statement, the Court concluded that "[t]he
record as a whole did not affirmatively establish defendant's
full knowledge and understanding of the consequences of his plea
under Rule 11 (5) (e) ."3

C.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADVISE
DEFENDANT THAT HE COULD BE SENTENCED
CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE SENTENCE HE WAS
ALREADY SERVING
As previously noted, under Smith, the trial court is
required to show that a defendant is unequivocally and clearly
informed about the sentence which might be imposed.
P.2d at 466.

Smith, 777

In the case at bar, defendant was never informed

that he might have to serve his sentence consecutively with the
sentence he was already serving.

(T. 3/21/88, p. 1-4)

The Utah Court of Appeals in Pharris, 143 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 39 n.12, also rejected an inadequately phrased warning of
defendant's allowable sentence. In Pharris, the defendant's
allowable sentence was listed as: "Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" under
notation: "Crime, Degree, Punishment." However, the Court
specifically noted that the listing did not contain "years"
following "0-5."

12

Therefore, the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11(5) which
mandates that the defendant be informed "of the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences."

Rule 11(5)(e) Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Defendant asks this Court to remand this case to the
trial court with an order to allow defendant to withdraw his
previously entered guilty plea.

*]£:

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED^this />_

da

Y

of

January, 1991.

IE L. MOWER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this __/S_.-_ day of January,
1991, I caused to be delivered four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the attorney for the
plaintiff/appellee herein, Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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ADDENDUM 1
(Affidavit of Defendant, March 21, 1988)

I n th^ District

Court

of the Third

•IticllcliftIt*9'lartoPl«r-

State of Utah

MAR z 1 1988

THE STATE OF UTAH.

H Dixon rtjpitoj, ~.z, • „*j List Court

Plaintiff

s\

Affidavit of Defendant

vs

*

Criminal No.
Defendant
, under oath, hereby acknowledge that 1 have entered a plea of
guilty to the charge(s) of'
(Name of Crime)

/

Facts:

Elements

CLZJPJ^UU-WKY\:

h-ujc^ • y JLSS^S

\ have received a copy of the aharge (Information)^md understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a
(De:gree of Ft
Felony or Class off Misdemeanor)

and understand the punishment for this crime may be
prison term #

fine, or both. I am not on druisjoralcohol.

My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney
who has explained my rights to me and I understand them.
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire.
2. I know that if l wish to have a trial I have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have a right to have m> witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if l choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held
against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that I have arightnot to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that l have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless l choose
to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the
proceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered.
1. 1 also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which 1 have been
mnvirt^i

A n r tr» t t / k l ^ k I !•*•«»» — I - - J

—.-'I*

o r s e n i e n c e 01 i m p r i s o n m e n t u p o n m e a n a n o p r o m i s e s nave been m a d e t o m e by a n y o n e as t o what the s e n t e n c e will ~

be.

9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)):

will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge.
10. 1 have read this Affidavit, or 1 have had it read to me by my attorney, and 1 know and understand its contents. 1
.years of age, have attended school through the.
..and I can read and
am
understand the English language.
Dated this

day of.

S?K^*Jl
-z?

1 9 ^
Defendant

Subscribed and syoin tofeehpreme in Court this.

H. DIXON HINDLEY
a©*

t&^&U'^cU

By

Judge

D«ruti>Ct«?rk
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:
1 certify that I am the attorney for
, the defendant named above and I know he
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements,
representations and declarations made by the defendant in th^ foregoing^Affid^it are in all respects accurate and true.

Defense Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
1 certify that 1 am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against ^ - g c ^ ^ ^ U ^ T ^ S ? — - > , defendant.
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest.

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.^~ % ^&~
-<r"'-2^2,
yy
Done in Court this

U-L

day of

S/Z^^^C^^

ATTEST

H. DIXON HINDLEY
Clerk
/n

fJ

District Judge *

% l9<

ADDENDUM 2
(Disposition Hearing, March 21, 1988)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4
5

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

6
7

Transcript of:
Disposition
(Pages 1-9)
Defendant's Motion
to withdraw
Guilty Plea
(Pages 10-20/21-59)
Case No. CR88-127

vs.

8
9

JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA
Defendant.

10
11
The

12
13
14
15
16
17

regularly

above-entitled

for hearing

cause

of

action

before the Honorable

came

Leonard H.

Russon, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the
State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, March
21, 1988.

APPEARANCES

18
19

For the State:

KAREN KNIGHT-EAGAN
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

FRANCES PALACIOS
Attorney at Law
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

20
21
22
23
24
25

on

1

MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1998

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

This is the time set for

4

disposition in the case of State of Utah vs. Quintana

5

CR88-127.

6

the status of this case?

7

This time was set for disposition.

MS. PALACIOS:

What is

Your Honor, today we are

8

prepared to move to withdraw our previously entered plea

9

of not guilty to count 1 of the Information and enter a

10

plea to an Attempted Aggravated Robbery, which would

11

constitute a second degree felony, keeping in that felony

12

the enhancement provisions of the aggravation.

13

J

In exchange for that plea, the State would move

14

to dismiss count 2 and I believe count 3, in the amended

15

information, is the habitual criminal and also move to

16

dismiss that count as well.

17

MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

18

I would move to dismiss count 1 to reflect the charge of

19

Attempted Aggravated Robbery, second degree felony, but

20

remain included in that paragraph is the firearm

21

enhancement.

22
23

THE COURT:

Mr. Quintana,. have you discussed

this with your attorney?

24

MR. QUINTANA:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, I have.

You understand you have certain

1

rights under the constitution and if you plead guilty

2

here today, that you are waiving those rights?

3

MR. QUINTANA:

4

THE COURT:

5

An affidavit has been prepared and

have you read that affidavit?

6

MR. QUINTANA:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yes.

Have you reviewed that with your

attorney?

9

MR. QUINTANA:

10
11

Yes.

THE COURT:

Yes.

Were there any words or phrases or

sentences in the affidavit you did not understand?

12

MR. QUINTANA:

13

THE COURT:

No.

Are you under the influence at the

14

present time of any drugs or medication that would impair

15

your good judgment?

16

MR. QUINTANA:

17

THE COURT:

18

sign your affidavit.

19
20
21

No.

Would you go ahead, please, and

MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:

Your Honor, I have signed

it.
MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, I have signed it on

22

behalf of Mr. Quintana and Karen Knight-Eagan has signed

23

it on behalf of the State.

24
25

THE COURT:

Mr. Quintana, for one to be found

guilty of Attempted Aggravated Robbery or to plead guilty

1

J to that crime, one has to have attempted by force or fear

2

J to take the property from another person and to do so

3

with a deadly weapon, in this case a gun.

4

those to be the elements of the crime?

5

MR. QUINTANA:

6

THE COURT:

You understand

Yes.

This affidavit says that you

7

attempted to take property from an employee of the Magic

8

Store and you did so with the use of a gun; is that what

9

happened?

10

MR. QUINTANA:

11

THE COURT:

12

Yes.

And is that why you are going to

plead guilty here today to Attempted Aggravated Robbery?

13

MR. QUINTANA:

14

THE COURT:

Yes.

You understand that this particular

15

crime to which you will be pleading is a second degree

16

felony and carries a possible sentence in the State

17

Prison of one to fifteen years?

18

MR. QUINTANA:

19

THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

You also understand that there

20

could be an enhancement of zero to five years because you

21

used a firearm or a gun at the time of the attempted

22

aggravated robbery?

23

MR. QUINTANA:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yes.

Have any promises or threats been

made to you to induce you to make this guilty plea today?

MR. QUINTANA:
THE COURT:

No.

Knowing all that we have talked

about, is it still your desire to plead guilty to this
particular crime?
MR. QUINTANA:
THE COURT:

Yes.

To the crime, then, to count 1 of

the amended Information as amended, Attempted Aggravated
Robbery, a second degree felony, do you plead guilty or
not guilty?
MR. QUINTANA:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

The Court finds that the defendant

has freely and voluntarily made a guilty plea to count 1
as amended and accepts that guilty plea.

And do I have a

motion as to counts 2 and 3?
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:

We move to dismiss, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
dismissed.

The said counts are hereby

What about a date for sentencing?
MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, I have discussed

this matter with Mr. Quintana and I suppose I would ask
the Court to consider allowing Mr. Quintana to be
sentenced today and allow the sentence with respect to
the one to fifteen, to run concurrently with what he is
serving.

I do have some background information.
THE COURT:

First of all, let's just consider
4

whether or not we should sentence today.
Mr. Quintana, by statute in this State, I am
not supposed to sentence you for at least two days from
today and within 30 days.

However, this is something

that you can waive, if you want.

If you desire to be

sentenced today, you do so without the benefit of a
Presentence Report and we can do that.
you have to agree to.

Do you, in fact, agree to that?

MR. QUINTANA:
THE COURT:

That is something

I might as well do it today.

Do you, in fact, then waive the

statutory right you have not to be sentenced within two
days of taking the plea?
MR. QUINTANA:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Does the State have a

recommendation at this time?
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:

Your Honor, it would seem

appropriate since Mr. Quintana is already at the prison
to commit him for the additional one to fifteen-year
term.

The State's request is going to be that that run

consecutively to his present commitment since it is an
entirely separate criminal episode and crime.
In addition, the sentencing on the enhancement
is covered in 76-2-302 (sub. 2) it requires a minimum
sentence to add a consecutive year.
THE COURT:

As for the enhancement zero to
5

five?
MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:

The minimum required by the

statute would be one year consecutively.

It allows the

Court to provide for an indeterminate zero to five and
run it consecutively.
MS. PALACIOS:

I have a copy for the Court,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

When it comes to enhancement, do I

do that zero to five like any indeterminate sentence, or
do I choose a number of years between zero to five?
MS. PALACIOS:

My understanding, the Court

makes at least a one-year sentence.
Court may make it for more.

But after that the

We would request the Court

to impose the one-year statutory time since it does need
to run consecutively.
If I can give the Court some background with
respect to Mr. Quintana, Mr. Quintana has a 1971 burglary
conviction.

It shows as a second degree felony, however,

the reports that I have gathered and Mr. Quintana tells
me that was a burglary of a drug store.

It was at night.

At that time a burglary at night was considered a second
degree.

So, it was not a burglary of a dwelling.

He has

two other prior convictions for burglary and a theft
which is zero to five, which occurred at the same time
which nas to do with the burglary and theft from a drug
6

1

I store.

And that basically, Your Honor, explains

2

| Mr. Quintana's situation.

3

|

4

I committing this particular offense, he was under the

He has had a longstanding drug problem.

While

5

influence of alcohol and drugs.

And in a review of the

6

police report, it is quite clear that Mr. Quintana was so

7

intoxicated that he didn't know what he was doing.

8

are not saying there was no legal responsibility.

9

such a terrible job, he did this robbery while he was

We
He did

10

wearing a hat that said "Daryl" on it.

He barely left

11

the place and the police picked him up.

This is not

12

something he does plan out and does well.

13

result of a need for his drugs, he became involved.

14

It was a

Because of that, when he returns to the prison

15

we are going to ask the Parole Board to consider some

16

treatment for him before he is released.

17

in 1973 and remained out until 1985, and I think that

18

indicates there is a long period of time that he was on

19

I the street where he could perform the drugs that overcame

20
21

He was paroled

him again.
Mr. Quintana, while the record reflects a

22

number of DUI's, does not have a history of robberies or

23

assaultive-type crimes as this, and Mr. Quintana has

24
25

I indicated to me he is real concerned because he did
commit this type of crime and this is not something that

he, as a person, who is not intoxicated, would have even
considered doing.
We will ask the Court to consider he is before
the Board now on two zero to fives.

If the Court intends

to run this consecutively, we would ask the Court to also
consider to only sentence him on the one year for the
enhancement.
You have anything you want to add?
MR. QUINTANA:
THE COURT:

You have said it all.

Anything from the State?

MS. KNIGHT-EAGAN:

Nothing additional, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Were you on parole at the time of

this crime?
MR. QUINTANA: Yes.
THE COURT:

Is there any legal reason why

sentence should not be imposed at this time?
MS. PALACIOS:
THE COURT:

No legal reason, Your Honor.

Mr. Quintana, the Court is always

concerned about parolees, who commit crimes while on
parole, and what to do with them when they commit a
crime.

Because if one gets out of the prison on parole,

he is supposed to be on his best behavior.

If he commits

other crimes and go back and the sentence is concurrent
again, what is the real incentive to go straight and to
8

obey the law?

That is the first problem we have.

The second thing, with this case we are always
concerned about guns that are used.

According to the

Information, the manager, whoever was there at the store,
was ordered to lie on the floor and the terrifying
thought was going through their minds of whether or not
they are going to be shot and killed any minute, because
it is in the paper everyday and those few moments of
absolute terror for people are things that a Judge has to
also take into consideration.

I think this is a case

that I have to make the sentence consecutive, and I am
going to do that.
It is the judgment and sentence of this Court
that you, Jose Quintana, be sentenced to a term of one to
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the crime of
Attempted Aggravated Robbery.

That sentence is to run

consecutively to any sentence you are presently serving
in that prison.

And in addition to that, I am sentencing

you to an enhancement of one year for attempting to
commit this crime with the use of a firearm.

That

enhancement of one year will likewise be consecutive and
commitment forthwith.
(End of hearing.)

9

1

REPORTER«S CERTIFICATE

2

STATE OF UTAH

)

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

)

S3.

4
5
6
7
8
9

I, DOROTHY L. TRIPP, C.S.R., do hereby
certify:
That I am one of the Official Court Reporters
of the Third District Court of the State of Utah.
That on Monday, March 21, 1988, I reported

10

the testimony and proceedings, to the best of my

11

ability on said date in the above-entitled matter,

12

presided over by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon in the

13

Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of

14

Utah; and that the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to

15

9, inclusive, contain a full, true and correct account

16

of said proceedings of Quintana Disposition to the best

17

of my understanding, skill and ability on said date.

18
19
20

of October, 1990.

21
22
23
24
25

iday

O

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 0 3

Dorothy L. Tripp, C.S.
Official Codrt Reported
License No. 00074-1801-8

ADDENDUM 3
(Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
1/30/90 and 2/2/90)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4
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5
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6
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to withdraw
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(Pages 10-20)
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8
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA
9
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10
11
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13
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14
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15
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16
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APPEARANCES
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Attorney at Law
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20
21
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23
24
25

10

1

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1990

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

This is the time for hearing in

4

State of Utah vs. Quintana, CR88-127. Would you identify

5

yourselves and who you are representing.

6

VOICE:

7
8
9

Your Honor, Connie Mower with the

defendant who is present.
J

VOICE:

Barbara Byrne representing the State.

THE COURT:

And the record should show the

10

defendant is present here in court and this is the

11

defense's motion.

12

And you may proceed.

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, before the defense

13

proceeds with the motion, Ms. Mower has shown me her

14

delivery of the notice of .this and I wouldn't question

15

for a moment that she sent notice of this.

16

receive notice of it until yesterday afternoon at 4:00.

17

This morning I have received a copy of the transcript,

18

the copy of the affidavit and copy of the cases. The

19

State is not prepared to argue this at this time.

20

notice came from the Court yesterday afternoon and that

21

is the first we had heard of it.

22

be continued for the State to have an opportunity to

23

prepare argument on it.

I did not

Our

So I would ask that it

24

THE COURT:

Ms. Mower.

25

MS. MOWER:

Your Honor, back in August of 1989
11

when I was first appointed to represent Mr. Quintana, I
filed in open court, I believe, his Motion to Withdraw
his Guilty Plea subject to being noticed up once we had
received the transcript of the change of plea that was
had before Your Honor back in March of 1988.

I did make

a request for that transcript and received it towards the
end of October and subsequently noticed up this hearing
after doing the research on the matter.
I filed back in December a Notice of Hearing.
My copy which is conformed, it is not an exact copy,
shows that I signed it on December the 14th and that such
a copy of this was mailed to the County Attorney's Office
back in December.

We are prepared today and ready to

proceed on the issues.
The argument today will be as to issues as a
matter of law whether or not the Court should permit
withdrawal of his guilty plea based upon the record as it
currently exists. We are prepared to proceed and we
believe we have given notice.
THE COURT:

Well, I will give you some time,

Ms. Byrne, to look over —
MS. BYRNE:

Have you read the transcript?

No, Your Honor, as I said, I just

received the transcript this morning which Ms. Mower was
polite to provide to me.

I have been in Judge Rigtrup's

court in a Pretrial Conference since that time and have
12

1

not had a opportunity to read through it.

2

THE COURT:

I will proceed with this hearing at

3

this time.

4

see where we stand on it and grant you additional time if

5

necessary, Ms. Byrne, to make a further response if I

6

have to continue the hearing; but he is here from the

7

prison, and we might as well.

8
9

Let you make your arguments at this time and

It would appear from the file that notice was
given in December of this hearing.

That's more than 30

10

days away and there is a mailing certificate.

11

lost someplace, we confront that once in awhile.

12

at this point I have no choice but to proceed and you may

13

proceed.

14
15
16
17

MS. BYRNE:

If it got
I think

Your Honor, just for the record, I

am not questioning that Ms. Mower sent it.

I am merely

J stating that in point of strict fact I never got it.
That is the point I want to make.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

19

MS. MOWER:

Your Honor, before I proceed with

20

my argument today, I would like to hand the Court the

21

original of the transcript which was prepared by your

22

Court Reporter, if I may approach.

23

give the Court a copy of Rule 11 as it currently appears

24

in the cocoa version of the Utah Code and I will make an

25

explanation because there is some new language in there.

And further, I would

13

In addition to that, I will give the Court copies of the
Gibbons and Vasilacopulos cases.
THE COURT:

Let me read this transcript.

If

you had given it to me earlier, I would have had it read
before now.
MS. MOWER:

I should have, because I was here

earlier.
(Pause)
THE COURT:

Okay, I have read the transcript of

the sentencing hearing that occurred on March 21, 1988.
MS. MOWER:

That includes the change of plea.

THE COURT:

That's with the change of plea. I

meant the change of plea, right.
MS. MOWER:

I have also brought with me today a

copy of Rule 11 and the Gibbons and Vasilacopulos cases,
which I believe are dispositive.
(Pause)
THE COURT:

Okay, I have read.

Ms. Byrne, have

you read this authority that she has handed to the Court?
I know you are on a short leash here.
MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, unfortunately I am not

quite as fast as you are.

I am still struggling through

the transcript.
THE COURT:

Go ahead and read the transcript.

(Pause)
14

What I am going to do at this point is just

1
2

take an informal recess and allow Ms. Byrne, so she

3

doesn't feel rushed, to read the transcript and this case

4

authority and we will see where we stand at that point.

5

As I indicated, the State has indicated they don't

6

question that notice was probably given, but she has not

7

received notice and she is not really prepared to go

8

forward and that is unfair on one side or the other for

9

the Court to rule with that being the case.

If she feels

10

satisfied arguing this case after her review of the

11

transcript and this authority, then we'll go ahead and

12

argue it today.

13

continue this hearing until tomorrow or whatever.

If she doesn't, then we will just

14

MS. BYRNE:

Tomorrow would be fine.

15

THE COURT:

I can fit you in tomorrow morning

MS. MOWER:

I have a jury in West Valley, Your

16
17
18
19

again.

Honor, beginning at 9:00.
MS. BYRNE:

It will be a day and a half.

Your Honor, I think if I have a few

20

minutes to read this over, I can probably respond in a

21

defensive manner, I guess, to what counsel has presented.

22

I am, however, aware of other case law on this copy but

23

not being Kent Morgan, I cannot cite the Court the names

24

or citations.

25

THE COURT:

You don't look like Kent Morgan.
15

MS. BYRNE:

I am one of those that keep fact

situations in my head and occasionally holdings, but I
can't do names or cites.

It is not part of my

repertoire.
THE COURT:

Let me ask, Ms. Mower, at this

point, is it your position that the defendant was not
advised that the sentence could be a consecutive
sentence?
MS. MOWER:

Yes, there are two critical

problems with the transcript.

The first issue is with

regard to the waiver of rights, and a question whether
the Court complied with Rule 11(e) in making sure on the
record the defendant knew or understood his various
rights which he waived, those rights which, of course,
are contained in the affidavit.

That is question No. 1.

Question No. 2, was whether the Court properly
advised him that there would be a consecutive sentence,
not only to the sentence that he was currently serving
out at the Utah State Prison, but also the gun
enhancement.

Those are the two critical issues.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, with that in mind,

let's stand in informal recess for .about 20 minutes or 30
or 15, whatever it takes Ms. Byrne to review.

Did she

hand you copies of these cases?
MS. BYRNE:

She did, Your Honor.

I have the
16

two cases.
THE COURT:

Or shall we continue this?

It is

too bad you are not availabLe tomorrow morning.
MS. MOWER:

I am sorry.

I can't sit on this

case the whole time tomorrow.
MS. BYRNE:

Can I make an alternative

suggestion, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. BYRNE:

I think by 2:00 this afternoon I

could have the cases in hand and be prepared to argue. I
can do it by probably 11, but I have to be at roll call
in Circuit Court.

Is there any chance we can do this

this afternoon?
THE COURT:

What is that?

TRANSPORTATION OFFICER:

Judge, I am not sure

of the transportation.
MS. MOWER:

And, Judge, I am due in Ogden this

afternoon at 2:00 on an Order to Show Cause calendar.
Nov/, if that folds, I will be available.
THE COURT:

This won't take long to argue.

This is going to be a legal matter based upon this
transcript.

Based on the transcript and the affidavit,

it is going to be a legal argument.

It shouldn't take us

more than —
MS. MOWER:

Half hour?
17

THE COURT:

At the most, both sides half hour.

MS. MOWER:

I am long-winded,

MS. BYRNE:

I think if I go over to Circuit

Court, I can probably farm these cases to one of my
teammates and say "do this for me," and I can go over to
our library.

There is one particular case that I need

and I can be back here by 11.
THE COURT:

I don't want to rush you. We can

fit this in Friday morning if we have to.

Oh, we can't.

THE CLERK:

You can do it Friday afternoon at

THE COURT:

Okay, Friday afternoon at 1:30.

MS. BYRNE:

That would be fine.

MS. MOWER:

I think I am clear Friday afternoon

1:30.

and if not I guess I can make it clear.
THE COURT:
sure.

Mr. Quintana can make it, I am

I don't want to put the rush on you that fast. I

would have preferred tomorrow morning.
trial.

Ms. Mower is in

Let's go for Friday afternoon at 1:30.

So we

will simply continue this hearing now until Friday
afternoon at 1:30 and make sure he is transported in.
MS. MOWER:

Your Honor, for the Court, I am

aware of one other case that has been decided on the
issue of a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea which was
handed down, I think, in the beginning of 1989. That is
18

the Copland case.

As far as I know, it doesn't apply to

our facts.
There is another case which I worked on an
appeal, State of Utah vs. Kerry Ross Moore which resulted
in no opinion being published, but simply a minute.

If

there are other cases, I would certainly be interested to
know it.
MS. BYRNE:

As soon as I find it, I will notify

you.
Your Honor, one other matter for the record,
before we adjourn.

On page 4 of the transcript at line

19, I think there may be an error.

It indicates Ms.

Knight-Eagan is speaking and telling the Court MI have
discussed this matter with Mr. Quintana."
THE COURT:

What line, page 4?

MS. BYRNE:

Page 4, line 19.

speaker to be Ms. Knight-Eagan.

It indicates the

I would suggest to the

Court that that is probably Ms. Palacios because if that
were a statement by Ms. Knight-Eagan suggesting that the
sentence run concurrently

—

THE COURT:

I am sure that that is a

typographical error.

I think you would agree.

MS. MOWER:

I would agree that that is probably

Ms. Palacios speaking at this point, and the State
wouldn't have an interest in that.

It would be the
19

1
2

defense at that point.
MS. BYRNE:

I would be surprised if Ms. Knight-

3

Eagan had been discussing the matter with Mr. Quintana

4

when Ms. Palacios was there.

5
6
7

THE COURT:

Yes.

I am just going to write on

this copy.
MS. MOWER:

That is the original provided by

8

your Court Reporter and maybe we will make that part of

9

the record.

10

THE COURT:

Okay, then continue until —

This

11

incidentally, this sentencing took place prior to our

12

adoption of the new statement that we have all finally

13

put together, along with the County Attorney's Office and

14

Public Defenders Office.

15

put together some sort of a statement that covered all of

16

the bases.

17

that was used for years and years and years.

18

deal with this come Friday afternoon at 1:30.

It is kind of a joint effort to

So, this does come under the old affidavit
We will
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FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 199Q

1:30 P.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is the time for hearing in the

continued hearing of State of Utah vs. Quintana, CR88127.

Identify yourselves and who you are representing.
MS. BYRNE:

Barbara Byrne representing the

MS. MOWER:

Connie Mower appearing with the

State.

defendant who is present in court.
THE COURT:

The defendant is present and we

have held one hearing in this matter.

We continued it to

give the State an opportunity to review the authorities
submitted by the defendant and to review the transcript
of the hearing at the which time the plea was taken.
Now, Ms. Mower, anything further?
MS. MOWER:

Thank you.

You may proceed,
Your Honor, we are here

today on Defendant's Motion to set aside his previously
entered plea of guilty in this case.

Mr. Quintana was

originally charged in the Information with the crimes of
aggravated robbery, possession of a firearm by a
restricted person, and habitual criminal, as I recall. A
plea bargain was worked out between, the parties in this
case and by the record it would appear that on March 21,
1988, Mr. Quintana entered a plea of guilty to the charge
of attempted aggravated robbery and Count 2, which would
22

have been the possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, was dismissed, as well as the habitual criminal.
At the time the Court took Mr. Quintana's plea, the Court
did make use of an affidavit which was the old affidavit,
and not the one that is currently in use by the Court.
There was some discussion on the record and I have
provided the Court with the affidavit.

But to summarize

what occurred at the time of the taking of the plea,
counsel stated what the plea bargain was for the record.
The Court asked Mr. Quintana if he had discussed the plea
bargain with his attorney and he acknowledged he had.
You asked him if he understood that he had certain rights
and if he pled guilty he would be waiving the rights.
You asked him if he saw the affidavit; if he read it; if
he understood it.

"Do you have any questions about it?"

And you further asked him if he was under the influence
of drugs or alcohol.
At that point the Court instructed Mr. Quintana
to sign the affidavit entering his plea, I assume, and
also waiving his rights under the affidavit.

The Court

then reviewed with Mr. Quintana, this is contained on
pages 2 and 3, the elements of the offense and the
factual basis for satisfying those elements.

And Mr.

Quintana, on the record, acknowledged that the facts did
in fact satisfy the elements as set forth.
23

1
2
3

The critical portion of the affidavit comes up
now.

Beginning on page 3 of the transcript, the Court

J begins to describe what is the minimum and maximum

4

punishment that could be imposed on Mr. Quintana and the

5

Court begins about line 14:

6

particular crime to which you are pleading is a second

7

degree felony, which carries a possible sentence in

8

prison of 1 to 15 years?

9

COURT:

"You understand that this

MR. QUINTANA:

Yes, I do.

THE

You also understand there could be an enhancement

10

of 0 to 5 years because you used a firearm or a gun at

11

the time of the attempted robbery?

12

Yes.M

MR. QUINTANA:

The Court then asks if any promises or threats

13

had been made and then asks Mr. Quintana if he wishes

14

still to enter a plea of guilty, which in fact he does

15

and that is reflected on the transcript, page 4, line 10.

16

The problem that we have with the entry of the

17

plea, Your Honor, is that this plea was an involuntary

18

plea and was not a knowing or intelligent plea.

19

the transcript, at the time of the taking of the plea and

20

even taking into account the affidavit that was prepared,

21

I there were two problems.

Based on

No. 1 problem, and the most

22

significant problem, is that the Court does not advise

23

Mr. Quintana on the record that there is a possibility

24

that with the aggravated robbery charge, with gun

25

enhancement, that the Court has the option of imposing 1
24

to 15 on the aggravated robbery and consecutively an
additional 0 to 5 on the enhancement, gun enhancement
portion of that crime.
It is significant in the transcript that there
is no discussion of consecutive sentences until later on
when the Court begins the sentencing process.

And the

first time I see it, the word even, "consecutive" comes
in on page 5 when Ms. Knight-Eagan requests that he be
sentenced consecutively to the case he was already on
parole on, consecutive to the 1 to 15 aggravated robbery
and the gun enhancement consecutive to that.

That is the

only reference in this transcript or the beginning
reference, and I would ask the Court to note that is
after the taking of the plea.
The Court is aware that under Rule 11(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure that the Court is
required, and absolutely required, to establish certain
things on the record before the Court can accept a plea.
And specifically in question here are in Rule 11(3)5,
(e)5-C, and (e)5-E.

The rule requires that the Court may

refuse to take a plea of guilty or no contest and may not
accept this plea until the Court has found (e) this
portion:

"The defendant knows the minimum and maximum

sentences that may be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of
25

1

I the imposition of the consecutive sentence."

2

1

3

J is that the Court did not inform the defendant that the

So, the mistake, I would suggest to the Court,

4

Court could impose a 1 to 15, and then a 0 to 5

5

consecutive for the gun enhancement.

6

I have given the Court at our last hearing

7

copies of two cases which I think are particularly

8

relevant, and the most significant, I guess, begins with

9

Gibbons but before the Gibbons case came down, Your

10

Honor, the caption was Warner

11

THE COURT:

—

Well, I am familiar with the law,

12

and that is the reason, you see, we now have —

When this

13

problem came up, we changed the statement.

14

statement" now that used in place of that affidavit.

We call it "a

15

J I am familiar with the law.

16

argue that if necessary.

17

Ms. Byrne as to her position in this regard.

So

I will give you a chance to

I am interested in hearing from
Okay?

18

MS. MOWER:

I will sit down.

19

THE COURT:

Is there anything you want to say

20

other than what the law is?

21

MS. MOWER:

Yeah, there is a second point, Your

23

THE COURT:

Oh, go ahead.

24

MS. MOWER:

With the first point, I think it is

22

25

Honor.

I pretty clear that on the record nowhere does it talk
26

about the consecutive sentences with respect to the gun
enhancement; but the second point, Your Honor, I think is
a finer question.

And that is the Court in its exchange

with the defendant before you took the plea, did not
advise the defendant of his rights under the
constitution.

And that is contained in subparagraph C of

Rule 11 and those are the things like his rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial, right
to confront and cross examine the witnesses in open
court.

Those kinds of rights.

reference to those.

The Court doesn't make

And my suggestion would be that in

view of the fact that the legislature has seen fit to
enumerate these particular rights which must be waived in
open court, the Court should have made reference to them.
I guess the question arises whether because those rights
are talked about in the fine print of this old affidavit,
whether that is sufficient to meet the requirement of
this rule.
is not.

And my argument would be, Your Honor, that it

I think that the affidavit can contain a number

of things and save the Court some time in addressing some
issues.

But I believe that the requirements of Rule

11(e) say that you need to have some kind of specific
finding about knowing, voluntary waiver of these
particular rights as they are contained in these
paragraphs.

That is the secondary problem.

The first
27

problem is the most serious, I think, of problems.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Byrne.

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, there are a couple of

points that the State would like to raise.

One of them

is that under Rule 77-13-6, which is the section on
allowable pleas and what may be done with them, the
section added by the legislature and made operative as of
July of 1989, indicates that there is a 30-day limit on
the time between when the plea is entered and the time
there may be a motion to withdraw it. The State has a
question as to whether this is the appropriate way to
raise the issue or whether the appropriate way is by Writ
of Habeas Corpus.

That would be our first point.

The second point, I trust the Court has a copy
of the Smith case which I did bring in earlier.
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. BYRNE:

Under Gibbons there is an inference

that all of the information that the defendant must be
advised of, he must be advised of verbally by the Court,
before he enters his plea.

But in Smith, and that would

be at page 465, the first full paragraph, there is
certainly at least an inference there this information
may be furnished either in the affidavit or orally by the
Court at the time of taking the plea, rather than the
inference that we have in Gibbons that it must all be
28

orally on the record.
THE COURT:

Where are you reading?

MS. BYRNE:

I am reading in the first full

paragraph beginning, "It indicates before us today
neither defendant's affidavits regarding the plea — "

It

is the first full paragraph in the first column, 465.
There is an inference there that you have got to have it
one place or another.

You have got to have it either in

the affidavit or in the Court's verbal instructions,
inquiries of the defendant before he enters the plea.
This seems to state you have got to have it one place or
the other, but not necessarily both.
It would be the State's position that given
what the Court indicates in Smith, that if you have that
information one place or the other, you are okay.

It is

a knowing and voluntary plea that would be made at that
point.
The federal cases that the Court relies on
seems to indicate how concerned the Court is that the
Judge just talks to the attorney and the attorney answers
"Yes, I have explained this to the defendant.

Yes, the

defendant has read it." And "Yes, the defendant wants to
enter his plea."

The federal cases seem to indicate that

their concern is that the Judge talk to the defendant.
I would point out that in the transcript of the
29

1

hearing it seems to me that the Court had quite a bit of

2

J conversation directly with the defendant and not through

3

I the attorney.

For example on page 1, at line 22, the

4

Court asked directly of Mr. Quintana, "Have you discussed th

5

with your attorney?"

6

THE COURT:

He says, "Yes."
Let me ask you this.

Does the

7

affidavit or the transcript indicate that the defendant

8

was advised that his sentence could be consecutive to any

9

sentence he was then presently serving?

10

Let's start with

that one.

11

MS. BYRNE:

Sure.

Your Honor, I believe that

12

the Court did make that indication to the defendant and

13

that would be on the transcript page 3, beginning at line

14

19.

15

The Court has already in the previous paragraph

I explained that the possible sentence for the second

16

degree felony is 1 to 15 years.

17

he understands.

18

Mr. Quintana indicates

At line 19, the Court states, "You also

J understand there could be an enhancement of 0 to 5 years

19

because you used a firearm?"

20

position that that is advice of an additional sentence.

21
22

THE COURT:

It would be the State's

Well, wasn't this defendant already

serving time at the State Prison?

23

MS. BYRNE:

He was, Your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

At the time he came before me for

25

I sentencing on a totally different crime?
30

MS. BYRNE:

He was, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And I think one of the problems is

whether or not he was advised that the sentence that I
was going to hand down could be made to run consecutively
and not concurrently with that term he was already
serving.

Isn't that one of your points?
MS. MOWER:

That is one of the points, yes.

MS. BYRNE:

Would the Court like me to respond

to that?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. BYRNE:

The State's response to that would

be there is no such requirement; that the Court always
has that option to make a new offense consecutive to the
old offense.
THE COURT:

Does Rule 11 say I have to advise

him it is consecutive?
MS. BYRNE:

I don't believe it does, Your

Honor, nor does the cases.

Now, in the cases of Gibbons

and Vasilacopulos, there is language indicating for the
Court to give the full information on consecutiveness.
That the Court must give that information.

But what they

are talking about in those two cases are crimes that the
plea of guilty is entered to at that time.

If someone

were to plead guilty to three offenses at the time he is
before the Court, if the Court intended to make these
31

1

sentences consecutive on those three offenses the

2

defendant was pleading guilty to at that time, the Court

3

would have to inform the defendant that there was that

4

possibility.

5

THE COURT:

Your point is that there is no

6

obligation on the Court to advise a defendant at the time

7

of sentencing that that sentence could be made to run

8

consecutively to any other sentence he was already

9

serving someplace?

10
11

MS. BYRNE:

That would be the State's position.

I do not see the requirement in 11(e) or the cases.

12

THE COURT:

Before we leave that point, let's

13

ask Ms. Mower.

14

obligation to advise him of that?

15

Is it your position that there was an

MS. MOWER:

I think so, in a situation where

16

the Court is aware that the defendant is serving a

17

sentence.

18

THE COURT:

Is there anyplace in the cases or

19

the statutes that would require the Court to so indicate

20

to a defendant?

21
22

MS. MOWER:

All the statute requires and the

I rule requires is that the defendant know the minimum and

23

maximum sentence to which a plea is entered.

So nothing

24

in the rule says that you have to do that.

25

suggest to the Court that there is a greater issue, and

But I would

32

1
2

that is the voluntariness or the knowingness of the
I guilty plea as far as the defendant is concerned.

1

3

think a defendant has the right to know, not under the

4

rule, but the Boykin case and the Alford case to enter a

5

plea knowingly and voluntarily.

6

Court is aware that there is a whole other charge out

7

there which is a current problem and the Court doesn't

8

advise at that point "By the way, I could run this

9

consecutive with your other charge."

10
11
12

THE COURT:

And I think that if the

But isn't that something that is as

logical as the nose on your face?

That if you have

J committed a crime and you are out there at prison, and

13

then you commit another crime, any logical person would

14

realize you don't have a right just to serve time on all

15

of these crimes.

16

wouldn't one just feel free, whether on parole or

17

whatever they are, to commit all the crimes they want to,

18

they only have to serve one time and they might as well

19

I mean, if that were the case, why

J rob 50 banks as 1.

20

MS. MOWER:

I understand the point the Court is

21

making.

The problem is that in all of the case law that

22

talks about knowing and voluntary pleas, the emphasis is

23

on what the defendant knows and is the defendant advised

24

on the record.

25

is perfectly logical that everybody would understand that

It may be perfectly logical.

I think it
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1

there is a right to jury trial.

2

to mention that again in open court?

3

society, but there is a requirement of, even though it is

4

generally known.

5

commonly known.

6

will affect the voluntariness of the plea on that

7

question?

8
9

I mean, why do we have
We all live in this

The question isn't whether it is
The question is, is it something that

THE COURT:

Okay, anything else on that, Ms.

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, in response to Ms.

Byrne?

10
11

J Mower's point, it seems to me that the legislature had

12

the opportunity to include that as part of Rule 11 and

13
14

J did not do so and the Supreme Court of Utah had the
opportunity to make that requirement in any one of these

15

J three cases that counsel and I have mentioned, but did

16

I not do so.

17

THE COURT:

What rule is that?

18

MS. BYRNE:

That is 77-35-11, is one of them.

19
20
21

The other one I have mentioned is 77-13-6.
THE COURT:

Well, 77-35-11 says that one of

those things is "that the defendant knows the minimum and

22

J maximum sentence that may be imposed on him for each

23

I offense to which a plea is entered, including the

24

possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences."

25

Is this the rule that was applicable at that time of
34

1

sentencing?

2

isn't it?

3

This isn't new.

MS. BYRNE:

This is the same old rule,

It is, Your Honor.

That same

4

information is enumerated in State vs. Gibbons which is

5

the case that caused the restructuring of the affidavits

6

and the admonitions.

7

THE COURT:

Shouldn't he have been advised then

8

that his plea of guilty in this case could cause a

9

sentence that would be consecutive to his other sentence?

10

MS. BYRNE:

Well, Your Honor, it would be the

11

State's position that the legislature did not make that a

12

requirement and we —

13
14
15

THE COURT:

What do you mean?

It just says

here "advise him of consecutive sentences."
MS. BYRNE:

That is true, Your Honor, but it

16

seems to me you would have to read that together with the

17

rest of the first part of the sentence which is that the

18

defendant knows the minimum and maximum that may be

19

imposed upon for each offense to which a plea is entered.

20

Not having to do with any previous pleas or sentences. I

21

believe that applies only to the pleas entered at the

22

J time of the entry of the plea.

And the cases that

23

interpret Gibbons and Vasilacopulds and Smith, all talk

24

about the case where the defendant enters a plea of

25

guilty to more than one charge at that particular time.
35

1

I And so that in the cases they say he must be advised that

2

I he can get consecutive sentences for those pleas entered

3

I at that time.

4

I

THE COURT:

That goes without saying and in

5

those cases were any of those defendants already serving

6

time?

7

MS. BYRNE:

No, Your Honor, they were not.

8

THE COURT:

So that issue did not come up?

9

MS. BYRNE:

No, it did not.

10

THE COURT:

Anything else on this one point?

11

MS. BYRNE:

Nothing beyond what I have said.

12

THE COURT:

The second point was what, the

13

enhancement?

14
15

MS. MOWER:

The enhancement with the attempted

aggravated robbery.

16

THE COURT:

That he was not advised of the —

17

MS. MOWER:

Consecutive.

18

impose consecutive sentences on that.

19
20

That the Court can

THE COURT:

On that because of the firearm

enhancement.

21

MS. MOWER:

Right.

22

THE COURT:

Ms. Byrne, that is the next

MS. BYRNE:

Okay.

23
24
25

argument.

make on that, Your Honor.

I would have two points to

One is that I believe the
36

Court did make that clear before the plea was taken on
page 3 of the transcript, beginning at line 19, when the
Court says, "You also understand that there could be an
enhancement of 0 to 5 years because you used a firearm?"
Mr. Quintana says, "Yes."

And it would be the State's

position that that is advising the defendant that there
could be additional time served.

That is what

enhancement means.
Also under State vs. Schroedder, the Court
indicates that no other notice is required of the
enhancement other than just indicating in the charge in
the Information that a firearm was used.
THE COURT:

What about that?

MS. MOWER:

Your Honor, I would simply say that

the Court, in spite of this language, the Court does not
tell Mr. Quintana on the record that the 0 to 5 that is
contained at line 19 and thereafter could be run
consecutively to the 1 to 15 on the principal charge; an
enhancement could possibly be an additional 0 to 5
concurrent.

How is the defendant to know what —

THE COURT:

How could that be an enhancement?

The whole object of enhancement is if someone commits a
crime, they have to pay a punishment.

But if they commit

that crime with a gun, then the punishment is going to be
greater.

That is the whole object of enhancement.
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I I

MS. MOWER:

I understand that, Your Honor.

2

J However, enhancement can be either at —

3

J we have indeterminate sentences.

You understand,

It can either be at the

4

one of the 1 to 15 years, or it could be at the 15

5

portion.

6

advise somebody that it could run consecutive as opposed

7

to adding additional time, say, making it a 2 to 16, as

8

it may have been interpreted in this case.

9

clear.

And it makes a dramatic difference if you

It is not

And the point is under Smith, and I think this is

10

where the Smith case helps us, is that the Court says you

11

have to be absolutely clear with unambiguous language

12

I what the sentence could be.

13

I they were talking about mandatory sentences.

14
15

And in Smith, of course,
With an

enhancement, what we are talking about, the firearm
I enhancement, we are talking about a mandatory sentence.

16

The problem we have is that the Court did not use

17

unambiguous terms.

18

It was not clearly unambiguous.

It

J is confusing and it would have been very simple to say

19

the word "consecutive," and unfortunately that word does

20

not appear before the changing of plea.

21

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, under the section

22

dealing with firearm enhancement, 76-3-203, unless it is

23

a third degree felony that is being pled to, it is not an

24

option that it run concurrent.

25

THE COURT:

It has to be consecutive.

Well, her point, it doesn't matter
38

what has to be or shouldn't be.

Her point is he has to

have been advised.
MS. BYRNE:

And my second point and the main

point would be that the manner —

Enhancement, as the

Court properly states, means more.

If something is

enhanced, that means there is more of it; not less and
not at the same level.

And I would submit that when the

Court uses at line 19, page 3, the language, "You also
understand," when the Court has already said, "for a
second degree, you get 1 to 15, and then also

in line

19, "you also understand if it be an enhancement of 0 to
5 because you used a firearm."
It would be the State's point that by using the
language you used the word "also," that indicates
additional, not the same, and the word "enhancement"
means more.

And I think there is no requirement that the

Court state unequivocally that it must be consecutive.
Merely that that information be imparted.

Whether it is

imparted using the word "consecutive" or not.

It does

not say in the cases that that particular word must be
used.
Again, I think that the qoncern in the federal
cases and I presume since the state court is also citing
those same cases, the Court's concern is that the Judge
have a conversation with the defendant, not just with the
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1

I defendant's attorney.

2

certainly did that.
MS. MOWER:

And in this instance, the Court

3

I

And I would respond to that. Your

4

I Honor, by reminding the Court of the Vasilacopulos case.

5

I understand it is not directly on point and, in fact, it

6

is pre-Gibbons case.

7

Vasilacopulos, the Court of Appeals said, "If you are

8

going to impose consecutive sentences, you have got to

9

use the word 'consecutive,' otherwise it is a violation

The fact of the matter was in

10

of Rule 11."

11

is something on the record where you can see that the

12

defendant is advised that it is consecutive, you haven't

13

advised him and he is entitled to withdraw his plea of

14

guilty.

15

strict compliance.

16

standard and when there is an error or the record is not

17

clear, and the Court hasn't strictly complied, the Court

18

must allow the defendant to withdraw his plea,

19

You have got to do that.

And unless there

Again, Rule 11(e) and under Gibbons, we have

MS. BYRNE:

Strict compliance.

That is the

Your Honor, may I inquire where in

20

Vasilacopulos the Court states you must use the word

21

"consecutive"?

22

MS. MOWER:

Page 95, left column, middle of the

23

page.

"The trial Court clearly failed to find

24

defendant understood the possibility of consecutive

25

sentences.

The State argues the record as a whole
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affirmatively establishes defendant's full
awareness of such a possibility.

We disagree."

And it

goes on to say that the only thing contained in this
particular record was a record in the affidavit which
didn't apply to his circumstance.
MS. BYRNE:

May I respond to that, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

You may.

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, looking at

Vasilacopulos at page 95 in the section cited by counsel,
it states there that the only record evidence that the
Court apprised the defendant of the possibility of
consecutive sentences in this case, was the Presentence
Report and recommendation submitted at the sentencing
hearing.

That would be in this case.

We have an awful

lot more than that on our record in the case under
consideration.
I would submit that the Court in the
Vasilacopulos case, that the Court must advise the
defendant that there is the possibility of consecutive
sentences.
language:

It does not say that the Court must use the
"I may sentence you to consecutive terms."

That is not required under this case or any other or the
statute that that word be used; and I think that looking
again at the transcript on page 3, lines lg through 22, I
think the Court did advise him.

And the Court further
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1

inquires, "Do you understand that?"

2

line 23, says, "Yes."

3

defendant a psychological examination after every

4

question the Court asks, I don't know how much clearer it

5

could be.

6
7

THE COURT:

And, you know, short of giving a

Okay.

Have we covered now the

points, Ms. Mower?

8
9

And Mr. Quintana, at

MS. MOWER:

No.

Your Honor, the final point

I was the rights that are specifically enumerated in Rule

10

ll(e)3.

11

incrimination, to a jury trial, to confront and cross

12

examine in open court the witnesses against him, and by

13

entering the plea he waives all of those rights.

14

was no discussion on the record about that.

15

Defendant knows he has a right against self-

THE COURT:

There

And you are saying that although

16

the affidavit clearly states those rights and I asked him

17

if he had reviewed that affidavit and did so with

18

J counsel, and understood all of the terms, that that is

19

I not enough?

20
21

MS. MOWER:

Yeah.

It is my position that

I because Rule 11(3) specifically talks about those rights,

22

that the Court is required to inquire upon the record

23

about those.

24

contain a lot of language and a lot of information for a

25

defendant, which may satisfy other requirements.

I think, as I said before, an affidavit can

But
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11(e) requires something affirmative.
I would point out to the Court that especially
in a case like this where there was the old affidavit, I
don't think by asking a defendant, "Did you read the
affidavit and did you understand it," that that meets the
requirement of establishing on the record that the
defendant do.

You don't know.

The Court can't make a

finding about knowing unless the Court inquires.

People

every day think that they understand and say they
understand, when they have no idea what they are talking
about.

And in order for the Court to find out, the Court

has to test the knowledge of the defendant.
THE COURT:

But he had standing beside him was

Ms. Palacios.
MS. MOWER:

True.

THE COURT:

A very competent criminal lawyer,

with long experience.

Heard all of these questions.

MS. MOWER:

True, and I have no question —

THE COURT:

Would you Just let me finish. I

let you finish.

Can I finish?

Who stood beside him and

heard me ask him, "Have you reviewed this with counsel
and do you understand all of the terms," and so forth.
And he said, "Yes."

And the affidavit is very clear and

lays out those in simple, concise, what I believe almost
is easier to understand language than the new statement
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Every paragraph, we have to go

through anyway so we might as well junk the statement?
MS. MOWER:

As a matter of fact, Gibbons says

that an affidavit is to be a starting point and not an
ending point.

The Court is required to review the

information contained on the affidavit with the
defendant.

And further, the Copland case —

didn't provide that —

affirms that notion.

review that with the defendant.
understanding.

You need to

You must test his

We don't permit people simply on their

say-so in this society.

We don't accept somebody's

representation that they understand.
you test understanding?
THE COURT:
anymore?

I'm sorry I

In school, how do

You take a test.

Why do we need defense lawyers

Why don't you leave them out of the picture

totally if they are useless?
theory is true.

They are worthless, if your

They are here in court to represent the

rights of clients and to make sure he understands or she
understands.

If what you say is true, there is no need

for lawyers anymore.

Let's just let each individual come

in before the Court and I have to make sure I have to
become a lawyer for that person.
MS. MOWER:

That is right.
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1

THE COURT:

That is what you are saying?

2

MS. MOWER:

That is right.

3

If the Utah Supreme

Court places that obligation on you in Gibbons and

4

Vasilacopulos, it is the duty of the trial judge to make
I
is

5

sure that this/on the record and that there are specific

6

findings, and they say it is just simply not enough.

7

Attorneys make mistakes.

8

communicate perfectly with their clients, and they don't.

9

THE COURT:

Attorneys assume they

Now, does your client understand

10

that if we do allow him to withdraw his plea, all the

11

charges are reinstated and we start from scratch, all

12

counts?

13

MS. MOWER:

Let me ask him.

Do you understand

14

that, Mr. Quintana, that if this plea is withdrawn, you

15

go back to facing charges of a first degree felony,

16

aggravated robbery, possession of a firearm by a

17

restricted person, and habitual criminal?

18

MR. QUINTANA:

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

Now —

never mind.

Well, go ahead if you want to talk

20

J to your lawyer, but I want you to fully understand that.

21

I I haven't made up my mind yet.

22

MR. QUINTANA:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Can I say something?

You better ask your attorney if you

can say something.
MS. MOWER:

Your Honor, perhaps we can take a
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few moments.
THE COURT:

Let's take a five-minute recess.

Is that enough time?
MS. MOWER: Yes.
(A brief recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

Okay, anything further?

MS. MOWER:

Yes, Your Honor.

After talking to

my client during the brief recess, my client has asked me
to move the Court to request an additional form of
relief.

It would be his preference rather if the Court

had the alternative of granting him his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and starting afresh at trial,
his actual preference would be that the Court amend his
sentence to reflect concurrent, where the Court feels
that the. Court imposed a consecutive sentence without
advising him.
THE COURT:

I won't do that.

There is only one

motion here and that is to withdraw the plea.

I will

either grant it or deny it. And if I deny it, then I
suppose your next step would be to the Supreme Court.

If

I grant the motion, then the plea is withdrawn and we
step back exactly to where we were just before the plea
was taken.

All charges again would appear, the three

different counts, and then we would set a trial date and
proceed.

That is where we really are on this thing.
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1
2

MS. MOWER:

In that case, we would like a

ruling on our motion.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else?

4

MS. BYRNE:

Yes, Your Honor.

For the record,

5

before the Court makes its judgment on this, I would like

6

to note that in the affidavit it clearly states each of

7

the constitutional rights that the defendant gives up,

8

including the right to trial, to have the State present

9

witnesses and prove each and every element, and all other

10

constitutional rights.

11

would also point out that the Court does not inquire just

12

of counsel if the defendant understands his rights. The

13

Court inquires of the defendant and that, I believe, is

14

the main thrust of the federal cases, that the Court and

15

the defendant have a colloquy.

16

the defendant says when he says, "I do understand my

17

rights.

18

that I do not understand."

19

the door to chaos because there would be no way that the

20

Court could trust anything that the defendant said he

21

That is in the affidavit.

If you cannot trust what

There are no words or phrases in the affidavit
Then I think we are opening

I understood.

22

The State would submit it with that.

23

THE COURT:

24
25

I

Okay.

Did you have anything else?

I You get the last word.
MS. MOWER:

I would just simply point out to
48

the Court that when we all applied to be admitted into
the bar, we felt as though we understood, after three
years of law school, what the law said.

The Bar

Association and the Supreme Court don't take our word for
it after clear study that we understand.

They force us

to take a test to make sure we do truly understand.

I

think that no less is required of the Court to make sure
that a non-law educated defendant has a proper
understanding of what is going to be imposed upon him.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

At the time the plea was taken, an

affidavit was presented signed by the defendant, and that
was on March 21, 1988. And in that affidavit he
indicates —

it is indicated that he had read the

affidavit or had it read to him by his lawyer; that he
knew and understood its contents; and that he could read
and understand the English language.

And in that

affidavit all of his constitutional rights were set forth
and the defendant in this statement that he had signed,
it is indicated that he was represented by Frances
Palacios who explained all of his rights to him and that
he understood such rights.

And those rights are also set

forth in that affidavit.
Doesn't that affidavit further state that he
understood the punishment for this crime?

Maybe 1 to 15
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1

years, plus enhancement, 0 to 5.

2

affidavit.

3

And that is in the

And also part of the certificate is the

4

certificate of the defense lawyer, Frances Palacios,

5

where that states and I quote, "I certify that I am the

6

attorney for Jose Quintana, the defendant above-named,

7

and I know he has read the affidavit or that I have read

8

it to him, and I discussed it with him, and believe he

9

fully understands the meaning of its contents, and is

10

mentally and physically competent.

11

knowledge and belief, the statements and representations

12

and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing

13

affidavit, are in all respects accurate and true."

14

To the best of my

There is additional information contained in

15

this affidavit and the document stands for itself,

16

including a certificate of the prosecuting attorney.

17
18

Now, the Court did not rest on that affidavit
J alone or the face of it alone, but had a personal

19

exchange with the defendant at the time of sentencing and

20

the transcript of the hearing indicates that the Court

21

asked Mr. Quintana if he had discussed this matter with

22

his attorney and he said, yes, he had.

23

at that time, "Do you understand you have certain rights

24

under the constitution, and if you plead guilty here

25

today that you are waiving those rights?"

And I asked him

And he
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indicated, yes, he did understand that.

I asked him if

he had read the affidavit and the answer was yes. I
asked him if he had reviewed the affidavit with his
attorney and his answer was yes.

I asked him if there

were any words or phrases or sentences in the affidavit
that he did not understand and he said no.

I asked him

if he was under the influence at the present time of any
drugs or medication that would impair his good judgment.
His answer was no and then at that point I asked him if
he would then —

"Would you go ahead and sign your

affidavit."
The transcript also indicates that I instructed
Mr. Quintana as to the elements of the crime and then
asked him —

I instructed him what the elements were and

asked him if he understood those elements and his answer
was yes.

And I reiterated what his affidavit said, that

he had attempted to take property from an employee of
Magic Store and did so with the use of a gun.

I asked

him if that is what happened and he said yes.

I asked

him if that is why he was going to plea guilty to
attempted aggravated robbery and he said yes.
him if he understood that this particular —
are my words:

I asked

and these

"This particular crime to which you will

be pleading is a second degree felony and carries a
possible sentence in the State Prison from 1 to 15
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1

I years."

His answer was, "Yes, I do."

And then I asked

2

I the following:

3

J enhancement of 0 to 5 years because you used a firearm or

"You also understand there could be an

4

gun at the time of the attempted aggravated robbery?"

5

And Mr. Quintana answered, "Yes."

6

matters that are referred to in this transcript and there

7

was a discussion in the hearing in which the prosecutor

8

indicated that Mr. Quintana was already at the prison and

9

the State requested that the sentence be consecutive to

There are some other

10

his then present commitment since it was an entirely

11

separate criminal episode of a crime, and there is a

12

further discussion as to enhancement and so forth.

13

With that in mind, I believe that he waived the

14

waiting period for being already in the prison.

15

waived the mandatory two-day waiting period for

16

sentencing, and requested immediate sentencing.

17

therefore, then there was an exchange as to what the

18

sentence would be and his lawyer made an argument and

19

gave some background information, and with that exchange

20

there was the usual discussion that takes place at the

21

time of sentencing and he was sentenced to consecutive

22
23

He

And

J terms.
The Court found at that time and so stated in

24

the transcript that based upon all of the foregoing in

25

the affidavit, that the defendant had made a voluntary
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and knowledgeable plea and the issues before the Court
now simply go to whether or not he was advised orally or
advised sufficiently.
The Court finds in addition to the
constitutional rights, that the affidavit, in addition to
the exchange that took place between the Judge and the
defendant, in the presence of his attorney, and the
certificate of the attorney, that he understood the
contents of the affidavit and that he had read it or she
had read it to him and they had discussed it. And in
addition to the defendant having said he had read and
reviewed that affidavit, and also had discussed it with
his attorney, and that in that affidavit the affidavit is
clear enough with all of this exchange that he fully and
truly understood the rights that he had and that the
rights that he was waiving, the constitutional rights at
the time the plea was taken.
As to the enhancement, the affidavit clearly
says that the defendant understood the punishment may be
1 to 15 years, plus enhancement, 0 to 5.

And there was a

discussion on the record of enhancement and the Judge
specifically indicated during the hearing, asked the
defendant if he understood that there could be an
enhancement of 0 to 5 years.

And the very word

"enhancement" indicates something in addition to. And
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1

the way the affidavit is worded, and that exchange, the

2

Court would find he understood that.

3

It leaves the third point.

The third point

4

being that Mr. Quintana at the time of sentencing in this

5

case was already incarcerated in the Utah State Prison

6

for a crime totally unrelated to this, I believe. I

7

don't know.

8

totally unrelated to this, but he was already an inmate

9

there.

I can't say that with authority.

And I would have to review —

I assume

We would have to go

10

back to the Presentence Report because my memory doesn't

11

serve me whether or not the crime in this case was while

12

he was out on parole, which my best memory is that it

13

was, but I could be mistaken.

14

that crime was committed separately and he just happened

15

to end up at prison before this one got tried.

16

serves me that he was on parole from the State Prison at

17

the time he committed this crime and that parole had been

18

revoked and he returned to the State Prison and therefore

19

was now serving that time for that original crime when

20

this one came up for sentencing.

21

would stand corrected if someone here knows and could

22

direct me in that regard; but that is my best memory.

Or whether this crime or

My memory

If I am in error, I

23

MS. BYRNE

I have that information.

24

THE COURT

Am I accurate?

25

MS. BYRNE

Your Honor, I have a certified copy
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of a previous conviction that was had before Judge Rokich
on August 20, 1985, in which the defendant was also
represented by counsel.

And those affidavits would

indicate that at the time of the commission of the
offense and the discussion here, he was on parole from
the Utah State Prison for the felonies which he either
pled or was convicted by Judge Rokich.

If the Court

would like, I could present the document to be made a
part of the record.
THE COURT:

Was he on parole when he was

sentenced, or do you know?
MS. BYRNE:

That is the indication I have, Your

THE COURT:

But anyway, it is clear he was at

Honor.

the State Prison when it was time for sentencing on this
case.
His attorney during the hearing says —
that —

states

asks the Court because of his history and

problems if —

she says, "If the Court intends to run

this consecutively, we would ask the Court to also
consider to only sentence him on the one year for the
enhancement."

And she asked Mr. Quintana then, "Do you

have anything to add?"

And he said:

"You have said it

all."
I asked him if he was on parole at the time of
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1

J this crime and Mr. Quintana said yes.

2

J parole at the time of this crime.

3

So he was on

I did not advise him, according to this

4

transcript, that the sentence could be consecutive with

5

the crime for which he was already serving in the State

6

Prison and the affidavit does not.

7

case and the other cases deal with defendants with

8

multiple counts and the necessity of the Court to advise

9

the defendant when one makes a plea to multiple counts

10

that each count carries a sentence and each one can be

11

consecutive, one with another.

12

in Utah that deals with the issue of where one has been

13

out on parole, commits a crime and, in fact, his parole

14

is revoked and he is back in prison.

15

trial for the crime he committed while on parole or makes

16

a plea, whatever the case may be, whether he has to be

17

advised that that sentence would be consecutive to the

18

one already being served in the State Prison.

19
20

The Vasilacopulos

I do not know of a case

And then he goes to

I am finding that such is not necessary because
it should go without saying that if one is in prison, is

21

I put out on parole and commits a crime while on parole,

22

and his parole is revoked and he is back serving his

23

original time, that any punishments for crimes committed

24

I while out on parole are going to be added to whatever he

25

I is serving while in the prison.

I don't think that a
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defendant in such a circumstance needs to be advised of
that.

It would be illogical and almost ludicrous to

think that one, while on parole could commit crimes
without any additional punishment.

Otherwise, parolees

all the time they would have nothing to risk except just
the original time they were serving and there would be no
real inducement to go straight on the outside.
I am making a finding that —
not a finding.

holding, I guess,

I am really making a holding then that in

this type of a situation, there is no necessity to advise
the defendant that his new crime is going to have a
punishment that could be consecutive to the time already
being spent in the prison and for the reasons I have
already stated.

I think I have covered all three points.

Have I?
MS. MOWER:

Yes, you have, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And that being the case, I will

deny the defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Plea.
MS. MOWER:

Your Honor, we need an additional

finding if the Court can help us.

The Court has made

reference in its ruling today to information which came
after the taking of the plea.

For example, in this case,

the Court took his plea first and then there was a
sentencing hearing after the taking of the plea.

The

Court has referred to —
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1

I

THE COURT:

Well, I don't think that is

2

| necessary for the holding that I have made.

3

| have made it very clear what my holding is, regardless of

4

I what was said at sentencing.

I think I

The only reason it just may

5

have some added impact, if you want to say that in this

6

case, is the fact that the plea was taken and sentencing

7

done all the same time in the same hearing with his

8

attorney present in which therefore at that very same

9

time a discussion was made concerning hoped the sentence

10

J wouldn't be consecutive or not.

It may have just

11

happened two or three minutes after the plea was taken.

12

But it is all taken there all basically there at the same

13

time, which I don't think it is necessary, but would seem

14

to indicate that it was pretty clear in the mind of the

15

defendant and his attorney that that certainly was a

16

possibility, or it wouldn't have been brought up at that

17

moment.

18

Okay, that being the case, you may prepare the

I findings and my order.

19

MS. BYRNE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I will do

20

that.

While we are still on the record, I would note

21

that as I believe I pointed out in my argument

22

previously, that there is also an advice of the possible

23

enhancement on firearm before the defendant enters his

24

plea and that would be on the transcript at page 3, lines

25

lg to 22.
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THE COURT:

I thought I referred to that.

MS. BYRNE:

You may well have, Your Honor, but

counsel asked about it only happening subsequent to the
taking of the plea, inclined me to mention that one more
time.
THE COURT:

I think she had reference to the

consecutive.
MS. MOWER:

The first mentioning of the word

"consecutively" was post taking.
MS. BYRNE:

Okay, just as long as we are

talking about that word.
THE COURT:

I did say the record does not

indicate that in the affidavit or the transcript itself,
that before the plea he was advised that this sentence
could be consecutive to the one he is already serving.
That is the reason I went to such great lengths to give
my reasoning why I don't think that was necessary.
other argument as to enhancement, that clearly —

The

the

affidavit not only says 1 to 15 years, plus enhancement,
but there was also an exchange on the record.
one is clear that he knew of that.

So that

But as for the other,

that is the one issue that I really had to rule on and
state the reasoning for that. 1 And, Ms. Byrne, if you
would prepare the appropriate —

make the findings as I

have basically said them so there is a record on that.
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